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We study the evolution of a social group when admission to the group is determined via consensus or unanimity
voting. In each time period, two candidates apply for membership and a candidate is selected if and only
if all the current group members agree. We apply the spatial theory of voting where group members and
candidates are located in a metric space and each member votes for its closest (most similar) candidate. Our
interest focuses on the expected cardinality of the group after T time periods. To evaluate this we study
the geometry inherent in dynamic consensus voting over a metric space. This allows us to develop a set of
techniques for lower bounding and upper bounding the expected cardinality of a group. We specialize these
methods for two-dimensional metric spaces. For the unit ball the expected cardinality of the group after T
time periods is Θ(T 18 ). In sharp contrast, for the unit square the expected cardinality is at least Ω(lnT ) but at
most O(lnT · ln lnT ).
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the evolution of social groups over time. In an exclusive social group, the existing
groupmembers vote to determine whether or not to admit a newmember. Familiar examples include
the freemasons, fraternities, membership-run sports and social clubs, acceptance to a condominium,
as well as academia. To analyze the inherent dynamics we use the model of Alon, Feldman, Mansour,
Oren and Tennenholtz [1]. In each time period, two candidates apply for membership and the
current members vote to decide if either or none of them is acceptable. The spatial model of voting
is used: each person is located uniformly at random in a metric space and each group member
votes for the candidate closest to them.
Alon et al. [1] analyze social group dynamics in a one-dimensional metric space, specifically,
the unit interval [0, 1]. They examine how outcomes vary under different winner determination
rules, in particular, majority voting and consensus voting. In consensus voting or unanimity voting
a candidate is elected if and only if the group members agree unanimously. Equivalently, every
member may veto a potential candidate.
Our interest lies in the evolution of the group size under consensus voting; that is, what is the
expected cardinality of the social group GT after T time periods? In the one-dimensional setting
the answer is quite simple. There, Alon et al. [1] show that under consensus voting if a candidate is
elected in round t then, with high probability, it is within a distance Θ(1/√t) of one endpoint of
the interval. Because the winning candidate must be closer to all group members than the losing
candidate, both candidates must therefore be near the endpoints. This occurs with probability
Θ(1/t). As a consequence, in a one-dimensional metric space, the expected size of the social group
after T time periods is E[|GT |]  lnT . Here we use the notation f  д if both f ≲ д and д ≲ f ,
where f ≲ д if f ≤ c · д for some constant c .
Bounding the expected group size in higher-dimensional metric spaces is more complex and is
the focus of this paper. To do this, we begin in Section 2 by examining the geometric aspects of
consensus voting in higher-dimensional metric spaces. More concretely, we explain how winner
determination relates to the convex hull of the group members and the Voronoi cells formed
by the candidates. This geometric understanding enables us to construct, in Section 3, a set of
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2techniques, based upon cap methods in probability theory, that allow for the upper bounding and
lower bounding of expected group size. In Sections 4 and 5, we specialize these techniques to
two-dimensions for application on the fundamental special cases of the unit square and the unit
ball. Specifically, for the unit square we show the following lower and upper bounds on expected
group size.
Theorem 1.1. Let the metric space be the unit square H. Then the expected cardinality of the
social group after T periods is bounded by lnT ≲ E[ |GT | ] ≲ lnT · ln lnT .
Thus, expected group size for the two-dimensional unit square is comparable to that of the one-
dimensional interval. Surprisingly, there is a dramatic difference in expected group size between the
unit square and the unit ball. For the unit ball, the expected group size evolves not logarithmically
but polynomially with time.
Theorem 1.2. Let the metric space be the unit ball B. Then the expected cardinality of the social
group after T periods is E[ |GT | ]  T 18 .
1.1 Background and Related Work
Here we discuss some background on the spatial model and consensus voting. The spatial model of
voting utilized in this paper dates back nearly a century to the celebrated work of Hotelling [16].
His objective was to study the division of a market in a duopoly when consumers are distributed
over a one-dimension space, but he noted his work had intriguing implications for electoral systems.
Specifically, in a two-party system there is an incentive for the political platforms of the two parties
to converge. This was formalized in the median voter theorem of Black [5]: in a one-dimensional
ideological space the location of the median voter induces a Condorcet winner1, given single-
peaked voting preferences. The traditional voting assumption in a metric space is proximity voting
where each voter supports its closest candidate; observe that proximity voting gives single-peaked
preferences.
The spatial model of voting was formally developed by Downs [10] in 1957, again in a one-
dimensional metric space. Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook [9] expounded on practical necessity of
moving beyond just one dimension. Interestingly, they observed that in two-dimensional metric
spaces, a Condorcet winner is not guaranteed even with proximity voting. Of particular relevance
here is their finding that, in dynamic elections, the order in which candidates are considered can
fundamentally affect the final outcome [5, 9].
There is now a vast literation on spatial voting, especially concerning the strategic aspects
of simple majority voting; see, for example, the books [11, 12, 20, 21, 23]. There has also been a
vigorous debate concerning whether voter utility functions in spatial models should be distance-
based (such as the standard assumption of proximity voting used here), relational (e.g. directional
voting [22]), or combinations thereof [20]. This debate has been philosophical, theoretical and
experimental [7, 14, 17–19, 25]. Recently there has also been a large amount of interest in the spatial
model by the artificial intelligence community [2, 3, 6, 13, 24]. It is interesting to juxtapose these
modern potential applications with the original motivations suggested by Black [5], such as the
administration of colonies!
Consensus is one of the oldest group decision-making procedures. In addition to exclusive social
groups, it is familiar in a range of disparate settings, including judicial verdicts, Japanese corporate
governance [26], and even decision making in religious groups, such as the Quakers [15]. From a
theoretic perspective, consensus voting in a metric spaces has also been studied by Colomer [8]
who highlights the importance the initial set of voters can have on outcomes in a dynamic setting.
1A candidate is a Condorcet winner if, in a pairwise majority vote, it beats every other candidate.
32 THE GEOMETRY OF CONSENSUS VOTING
In this section, we present a simple geometric interpretation of a single election using consensus
voting in the spatial model. In the subsequent sections, we will apply this understanding, developed
for the static case, to study the dynamic model. Specifically, we examine how a group grows over
time when admission to the group is via a sequence of consensus elections.
LetG0 = {v1, · · · ,vk } denote the initial set of group members2, selected uniformly and indepen-
dently from a metric space K . In the consensus voting mechanism, for each round t ≥ 1, a finite set
of candidates Ct = {w1, · · · ,wn} ⊆ K applies for membership. Members of the group at the start
of round t , denoted Gt−1, are eligible to vote. Assuming the spatial theory of voting, each group
member will vote for the candidate who is closest to her in the metric space. That is, member vi
votes for candidatew j if and only if d(vi ,w j ) ≤ d(vi ,wk ) for every candidatewk , w j . Under the
consensus (unanimity) voting rule, if every group member selects the candidatew j ∈ Ct thenw j is
accepted to the group andGt = Gt−1 ∪w j ; otherwise, if the group does not vote unanimously then
no candidate wins selection and Gt = Gt−1.
As stated, to study how group size evolves over time, our first task is to develop a more precise
understanding of when a candidate will be selected under consensus voting in a single election.
Fortunately, there is a nice geometric characterization for this property in terms of the Voronoi cells
(regions) formed in the metric space K by the candidates (points) C = {w1, · · ·wn}. Specifically,
the Voronoi cell Hi associated with pointwi is Hi := {v ∈ K | d(v,wi ) ≤ d(v,w j ) for all i , j}. We
will see that the convex hull of the group members G ⊆ K , which we denote S = conv(G), plays
an important role in winner determination. The characterization theorem for the property that a
candidate is selected under the consensus voting mechanism is then:
Theorem 2.1. Let C = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn} be the candidates and let H1,H2, . . . ,Hn be the Voronoi
cells on K generated by C . Then there is a winner under consensus voting if and only if S =
conv(G) ⊆ Hi for some candidatewi .
Proof. Assume S =⊆ Hi for some candidate wi ∈ C . Then, for every voter vj ∈ G, we have
d(vj ,wi ) ≤ d(vj ,wk ) for any other candidate wk ∈ C . Hence, every voter prefers candidate wi
over all the other candidates. Thus candidate wi is selected. Conversely, assume that candidate
wi is selected. Then, by definition of consensus voting, each voter vj ∈ G voted for wi . Thus
d(vj ,wi ) ≤ d(vj ,wk ) for all k , i . Ergo, G ⊆ S ⊆ Hi . □
Several useful facts can be derived from this characterization. These facts are stated in the
subsequent corollary and lemma.
Corollary 2.2. LetC = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn} be set of candidates. If there is a candidate accepted with
S = A, then the same candidate is also accepted with S = B for any convex set B ⊆ A.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1, a candidate is accepted if and only if the current convex hull is entirely
contained within one of Voronoi regions, H1,H2, . . . ,Hn , generated by the candidates. Clearly,
if A ⊆ Hi then B ⊆ Hi . Therefore, if there is an acceptance with S = A then there would be an
acceptance with S = B. The result follows immediately. □
The next lemma requires the following definition: let B(v,w) denote the Euclidean ball centred
at v with radius ∥w −v ∥. Furthermore, we denote by ∂S the set of vertices (extreme points) of the
convex hull S of the group members. Observe that conv(∂S) = S and that ∂S ⊆ G.
2We may take the cardinality of the initial group to be any constant k . In particular, we may assume k = 1.
4Lemma2.3. LetG be current set of groupmembers and S be its convex hull. LetC = {w1,w2, · · · ,wn}
be the current candidates. Under consensus, there is a winning candidate if and only if ∃wi ∈ C
such that
wi ∈
⋂
k ∈[n]\i
⋂
vj ∈∂S
B(vj ,wk )
Proof of Lemma 2.3. If there is a consensus then there is awi ∈ C who is selected. Hence among
all candidates, wi is closest to each group member. That is, d(vj ,wi ) ≤ d(vj ,wk ), for each group
member vj ∈ G and each candidatewk ∈ C \wi . It follows that
wi ∈
⋂
k ∈[n]\i
⋂
vj ∈G
B(vj ,wk ) ⊆
⋂
k ∈[n]\i
⋂
vj ∈∂S
B(vj ,wk )
where the last inclusion holds since ∂S ⊆ G. Conversely, suppose there exists a wi such that
wi ∈ ⋂
k ∈[n]\i
⋂
vj ∈∂S
B(vj ,wk ). Thus, wi satisfies d(vj ,wi ) ≤ d(vj ,wk ) for each voter vj ∈ ∂S and
wk ∈ C \wi . Hence we have ∂S ⊆ Hi , which implies conv(∂S) = S ⊆ conv(Hi ) = Hi asHi is convex.
Therefore G ⊆ S ⊆ Hi . Thus, by Theorem 2.1, candidatewi wins under consensus voting. □
Following Alon et al. [1], from now on we restrict attention to case of n = 2 candidates in each
round. The case n ≥ 3 is not conceptually harder and the ideas presented in this paper do extend to
that setting, but mathematically the analyses would be even more involved than those that follow.
3 GENERAL TOOLS FOR BOUNDING EXPECTED GROUP SIZE
In this section we introduce a general approach for obtaining both upper and lower bounds on the
expected cardinality of the social group in round t . These techniques apply for consensus voting in
any convex compact domain K . In the rest of the paper we will specialize these methods for the
cases in which K is either a unit ball or a unit square. In particular, lower bounds are provided for
these two domains in Section 4 and upper bounds in Section 5.
Let K be a convex compact set, and let Ct = {w1,w2} be candidates appearing in round t . We
assume each candidatewi is distributed uniformly on K . We may also assume that vol(K) = 1, as
otherwise we can absorb the associated constant factor into our bounds. Note that the expected
group size is E[|GT |] = ∑Tt=1 Pr[X t ], where X t denotes the event a new candidate wins in round t .
Let’s first present the intuition behind our approach to upper bounding the probability of selecting
a candidate in any round. Recall that, by Theorem 2.1, given two candidates {w1,w2} in round t + 1,
we accept candidate i if and only if St ⊆ Hi (w1,w2). Now in order for the convex hull to satisfy
St ⊆ Hi (w1,w2), it must be the case that in the previous round (i) St−1 ⊆ Hi (w1,w2), and (ii) a
new candidate did not get accepted inside the complement Hi (w1,w2) = cl(K \Hi (w1,w2)), where
cl denotes set closure. Applying this argument recursively with respect to the worst case convex
hulls for accepting candidates inside Hi (w1,w2), we will obtain an upper bound on the probability
of accepting a candidate. Such worst case convex hulls can be found by appropriately applying
Corollary 2.2.
To formalize this intuition, we require some more notation. We denote by Z (H ) the event that
a new candidate is selected inside H . Let Pr[Z (H )|S = A] denote the probability of selecting a
candidate inside H given the convex hull of the group members is A. The shorthand Pr[Z (H )|A] =
Pr[Z (H )|S = A] will be used when the context is clear. Note, by Lemma 2.3, the probability of
acceptance depends only on the shape of the convex hull of the members, and not on the round.
That is, if St = S tˆ = A for two rounds t , tˆ then the probabilities of accepting a candidate inside a
given region in the rounds t + 1 and tˆ + 1 are exactly the same.
5We say a set A is a cap if there exists a half spaceW such that A = K ∩W . We remark that caps
have been widely used for studying the convex hull of random points; see the survey article [4]
and the references therein. Of particular relevance here is that, in the case of two candidates, the
Voronoi regions for the candidates are caps. Furthermore, H1(w1,w2) = H2(w1,w2) and vice versa.
Theorem 3.1. Let K be convex compact domain and let fK (w1,w2) be any function which satisfies
fK (w1,w2) ≤ min
i
Pr[Z (Hi (w1,w2)) | Hi (w1,w2)]. Then
Pr[X t+1] ≲
∫
K
∫
K
e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2
Proof. Observe that, for any cap A, we have the following inequality:
Pr[St ⊆ A] =
(
1 − Pr[Z (A) | St−1 ⊆ A]
)
· Pr[St−1 ⊆ A]
≤
(
1 − Pr[Z (A) | St−1 = A]
)
· Pr[St−1 ⊆ A]
≤
(
1 − Pr[Z (A) | A ]
)t
(1)
Here the first inequality follows from Corollary 2.2. The second inequality is obtained by repeating
the argument inductively for St−1. Hence:
Pr[X t+1] =
∫ ∫
Pr[X t+1 | (w1,w2) are candidates]dw1 dw2
=
∫ ∫ (
Pr[St ⊆ H1(w1,w2)] + Pr[St ⊆ H2(w1,w2)]
)
dw1 dw2
≤
2∑
i=1
∫ ∫ (
1 − Pr[Z (Hi (w1,w2)) | Hi (w1,w2) ]
)t
dw1 dw2
≤ 2
∫ ∫
(1 − fK (w1,w2))t dw1 dw2
≤ 2
∫ ∫
e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2
The second equality holds by Theorem 2.1. The first inequality follows by combining inequal-
ity (1) and the facts H1(w1,w2) = H2(w1,w2) and H2(w1,w2) = H1(w1,w2). Next, by assumption,
fK (w1,w2) ≤ Pr[Z (Hi (w1,w2)) | Hi (w1,w2)] for each i; the last two inequalities follow immedi-
ately. □
As stated, Theorem 3.1 allows us to upper bound the expected group size. However, the theorem
is not easily applicable on its own. To rectify this, consider the following easier to apply corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Let K be compact space. If fK satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1 then
Pr[X t+1] ≲ 1
t
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
te−tλ · Φ(λ)dλ
where Φ(λ) =
∫ ∫
I [fK (w1,w2) ≤ λ]dw1dw2.
6Proof of Corollary 3.2. From Theorem 3.1, we have that,
Pr[X t+1] ≲
∫ ∫
I
[
fK (w1,w2) ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2
+
∫ ∫
I
[
fK (w1,w2) ≥ ln(t)
t
]
· e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2
≤
∫ ∫
I
[
fK (w1,w2) ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2 + 1
t
(2)
Next, consider the random variable Y = fK (w1,w2) and denote its cumulative distribution function
by FY (λ) = Pr[Y ≤ λ] = Φ(λ). Then∫ ∫
I
[
fK (w1,w2) ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−t fK (w1,w2) dw1 dw2 = E
[
I
[
fK (w1,w2) ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−t fK (w1,w2)
]
= EY
[
E
[
I
[
Y ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−tY | Y
] ]
=
∫ 1
0
I
[
λ ≤ ln(t)
t
]
· e−tλ dFY (λ) (3)
The second equality is due to the law of total expectation. Now, because FY is absolutely continuous
it has a density function. Combining (2) and (3), we then have that
Pr[X t+1] ≲ 1
t
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
e−tλ · d
dλ
Φ(λ)dλ
=
1
t
+
[
e−tλΦ(λ)
] ln(t )
t
0
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
te−tλ · Φ(λ)dλ
≲ 1
t
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
te−tλ · Φ(λ)dλ
Here the last inequality was obtained by noting Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(λ) ≤ 1. □
As alluded to earlier, when obtaining upper bounds for the unit ball and the unit square, we will
apply Corollary 3.2. Of course, in order to do this, we must find an appropriate function fK (w1,w2)
which lower bounds the probability of acceptance inside a Voronoi region Hi (w1,w2), given the
current convex hull is Hi (w1,w2). Finding such a function fK can require some ingenuity, but
Lemma 3.3 below will be useful in assisting in this task. Moreover, as we will see in Section 4, this
lemma can be used to obtain lower bounds as well as upper bounds on the expected cardinality of
the group.
Lemma 3.3. Given a two-dimensional convex compact domain K and a cap A. If z1 and z2 are the
endpoints of the line segment separating A and A then
Pr[Z (A) | A ] = 2 ·
∫
A
vol(B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩A) dξ
Proof. Without loss of generality, letw2 ∈ A be the selected candidate. Thus, by Theorem 2.1,
we have A ⊆ H2(w1,w2) because, by assumption, the convex hull of the voters is S = A. We
claim w1 < A. Otherwise, w1 ∈ A ⊆ H2(w1,w2). But, by definition of the Voronoi regions, we
have w1 ∈ H1(w1,w2). Thus, w1 ∈ H1 ∩ H2. However, this cannot happen unless w1 = w2, a zero
probability event. Therefore, we may assume thatw1,w2 ∈ A.
7Next, consider the line l(z1, z2) separatingA andA; that is, l(z1, z2) is the convex hull conv(z1, z2).
Given w1,w2 ∈ A we claim l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2) if and only if A ⊆ H2(w1,w2). First assume
A ⊆ H2(w1,w2). As A¯ is closed, z1 and z2 are in A¯. Thus, by convexity, l(z1, z2) ⊆ A¯ ⊆ H2(w1,w2). On
the other hand, assume l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2) and consider the Voronoi edge defined by E(w1,w2) =
H1(w1,w2) ∩H2(w1,w2). Then either E(w1,w2) ⊆ A or E(w1,w2) ⊆ A because l(z1, z2) separates A
andA and, by assumption, l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2). Furthermore, observe that the midpoint 12 (w1+w2)
is in E(w1,w2) and in A. So it must be the case that E(w1,w2) ⊆ A. But if E(w1,w2) ⊆ A then one
of the Voronoi regions contains A. In particular, A ⊆ H2(w1,w2) because l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2).
Therefore,
Pr[Z (A) | A ] = 2
∫
A
∫
A
I[A ⊆ H2(w1,w2)] dw2 dw1
= 2
∫
A
∫
A
I[l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2)] dw2 dw1
= 2
∫
A
vol(B(z1,w1) ∩ B(z2,w1) ∩A)dw1
Here the first equality holds since two candidates are equally likely to win by symmetry and, by
Theorem 2.1, the winning candidatew2 satisfies A ⊆ H2(w1,w2). The second equality follows from
the fact that l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2) if and only if A ⊆ H2(w1,w2) whenw1,w2 ∈ A. Finally, the last
equality holds because, by Lemma 2.3, we know that any candidate w2 ∈ B(z1,w1) ∩ B(z2,w1) is
selected with consensus voting. This is equivalent to l(z1, z2) ⊆ H2(w1,w2), by Theorem 2.1. □
4 LOWER BOUNDS ON EXPECTED GROUP SIZE
In this section we provide lower bounds for the cases where K is either a unit ball B or a unit
square H. Recall, we assumed that vol(K) = 1 but vol(B) = π for the unit ball. We remark that this
is of no consequence as we may absorb the associated constant factor into our bounds.
4.1 Lower Bound for the Unit Ball
For the unit ball B, a circular segment is the small piece of the circle formed by cutting along a
chord. Evidently, this means that every cap of B is either a circular segment or the complement of a
circular segment. Thus, to analyze the case of the unit ball we must study circular segments.
Lemma 4.1. Let B be a unit ball, and Jδ be a circular segment with height δ ≤ 18 then
Pr[Z (Jδ ) | Jδ ] ≳ δ 4
Proof. Let z1 and z2 be the endpoints of the chord defining the line segment Jδ . By rotating the
ball, we may assume the chord is horizontal. Furthermore, by translating the coordinates, we may
assume that z1 lies at the origin. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
To apply Lemma 3.3, let ξ = (x ,y). Observe that the region B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩ Jδ contains a
triangle T of height y and width
√
x2 + y2 − x . Again, this is shown in Figure 1. It follows that
vol(B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩ Jδ ) ≥ 12y · (
√
x2 + y2 − x) ≥ y
3
4(x + y) (4)
To obtain inequality (4) first observe, by Bernoulli’s Inequality, that
√
1 + y
2
x 2 ≤ 1+ 12
y2
x 2 . This implies(
1 + y
2
x 2
)
−
√
1 + y
2
x 2 ≥ 12
y2
x 2 . Rearranging terms, we obtain (x2 +y2) − x
√
x2 + y2 ≥ y22 . Equivalently,
8Fig. 1. The circular segment Jδ with inscribed rectangle R of height
δ
2
√
x2 + y2 −x ≥ y2
2
√
x 2+y2
≥ y22(x+y) , as required. Combining Lemma 3.3 with inequality (4) then gives
Pr[Z (Jδ ) | Jδ ] ≥
∫
Jδ
vol(B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩ Jδ ) dξ ≥
∫
Jδ
y3
4(x + y) dx dy (5)
To lower bound this integral, rather than integrate over the entire circular segment Jδ , we will
integrate over an inscribe rectangle. Specifically let R be the rectangle of height 12δ inscribed
inside Jδ . This rectangle, shown in Figure 1, has width 2
√
1 − (1 − δ2 )2 = 2
√
δ ·
√
1 − δ4 and is
centred at x =
√
δ · √2 − δ . Therefore,∫
Jδ
y3
4(x + y) dx dy ≥
∫
R
y3
4(x + y) dx dy
=
∫ δ
2
0
∫ √δ (√2−δ+√1− δ4 )
√
δ (√2−δ−
√
1− δ4 )
y3
4(x + y) dx dy
≥ 18 ·
∫ δ
2
0
∫ √δ (√2−δ+√1− δ4 )
√
δ (√2−δ−
√
1− δ4 )
y3
x
dx dy
≳
∫ δ
2
0
y3 ·
[
lnx
]√δ (√2−δ+√1− δ4 )
√
δ (√2−δ−
√
1− δ4 )
dy
≳ δ 4 · ln ©­­«
√
2 − δ +
√
1 − δ4
√
2 − δ −
√
1 − δ4
ª®®¬
≳ δ 4 (6)
The second inequality holds because δ ≤ 18 ; specifically, when δ ≤ 18 the circular segment lies under
the line y = x . Thus, every point inside the circular segment satisfies y ≤ x . The last inequality
follows by observing that the logarithmic term is lower bounded by ln
(√
2− 18+
√
1− 132√
2−
√
1− 132
)
≥ ln 5.
Combining the inequalities (5) and (6) completes the proof. □
Note that Lemma 4.1 can be used to prove lower bound on the expected cardinality of the group.
It is also used in later sections to obtain appropriate function fK when using Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 4.2. For the unit ball B, the expected group size after T rounds is E[|GT |] ≳ T 18 .
9Proof. For each t , we construct collection {At1,At2, . . . ,AtN (t )} of disjoint circular segments
on the unit ball. To do this, let the height of each circular segment in the collection be δ (t) =
1
4t
1
4
.Then we can fit N (t) =
⌊
π · t 18
⌋
of these segments into B. To see this, observe that a circular
segment of height δ has a chord of length 2
√
δ
√
2 − δ . The central angle of the segment is then
θ = 2 arctan
(√
δ
√
2−δ
1−δ
)
≤ 4√δ , implying the existence of at least N =
⌊
π
2
√
δ
⌋
disjoint circular
segments of height δ . Now define τ ≤ T to be the last round for which Pr[Sτ ∩Aτi , ∅] ≥ 12 . Thus,
E[|Gτ |] ≥
N (τ )∑
i=1
Pr[Sτ ∩Aτi , ∅] = N (τ ) · Pr[Sτ ∩Aτ1 , ∅] ≥
1
2
⌊
πτ
1
8
⌋
≳ τ 18 (7)
Here, the first inequality follows from the observation that if St ∩Ati , ∅ then there is a least one
group member insideAti . The equality is due to symmetry; that is, Pr[St ∩Ati , ∅] = Pr[St ∩Atj , ∅]
for each pair 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (t). The second inequality follows because, by definition, Pr[Sτ ∩Aτi , ∅] ≥
1
2 . Next consider rounds t > τ . For these rounds, by definition of τ , we know Pr[St ∩Ati , ∅] ≤ 12
which implies Pr[St ∩Ati = ∅] ≥ 12 . Therefore,
Pr[X t+1] ≳
N (t )∑
i=1
Pr
[
Z (Ati ) ∧
(
St ∩Ati = ∅
) ]
= N (t) · Pr [Z (Ati ) | St ∩Ati = ∅] · Pr[ St ∩Ati = ∅ ]
≳ N (t) · Pr
[
Z (Ati ) | Ati
]
Where the last inequality follows by Corollary 2.2. Finally by Lemma 4.1, we see Pr
[
Z (Ati ) | Ati
]
≳ 1t ,
and thus Pr[X t+1] ≳ t− 78 for any t > τ . We may now lower bound the expected group size at the
end of round T . Specifically, for T ≥ 4,
E[|GT |] = E[|Gτ |] +
T∑
t=τ+1
Pr[X t = 1] ≳ τ 18 +
T∑
t=τ+1
t−
7
8 ≳ T 18
The last inequality was obtained using integral bounds. □
4.2 Lower bound for the Unit Square
For the unit square H caps are either right-angled triangles or right-angled trapezoids (trapezoids
with two adjacent right angles). We can bound the probability of accepting a point inside a right-
angled trapezoid by consideration of the largest inscribed triangle it contains. Thus, it suffices to
consider only the case in which the cap forms a triangle.
Lemma 4.3. Let Ja,b be triangular cap on the unit square with perpendicular side lengths a ≤ b.
Then
Pr[Z (Ja,b ) | Ja,b ] ≥ 1211 a
4 ·
(
1 + ln
(
b
a
))
.
Proof. Take the unit square H and the cap Ja,b . Without loss of generality, we may assume the
hypotenuse is horizontal with one endpoint z1 at the origin. This is shown in Figure 2.
Again, setting ξ = (x ,y), we have that
vol(B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩ Jδ ) ≥ 12y · (
√
x2 + y2 − x) ≥ y
3
4(x + y) (8)
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Fig. 2. The Cap Ja,b (with sides lengths a,b and height
ab√
a2+b2
) and inscribed rectangle R of half the height.
Combining Lemma 3.3 with inequality (8) gives
Pr[Z (Ja,b ) | Ja,b ] ≥
∫
Ja,b
vol(B(z1, ξ ) ∩ B(z2, ξ ) ∩ Ja,b ) dξ ≥
∫
Ja,b
y3
4(x + y) dx dy (9)
Recall the cap Ja,b has perpendicular side lengths a ≤ b. Thus the height of Ja,b is ab√a2+b2 . Again, a
lower bound can be obtained by integrating over an inscribed rectangle rather than over the entire
cap Ja,b . Specifically, let R be the inscribed rectangle with half the height of Ja,b ; see Figure 2. Then∫
Ja,b
y3
4(x + y) dx dy ≥
∫
R
y3
4(x + y) dx dy
≥
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
∫ a2√
a2+b2
+ b
2
2
√
a2+b2
a2
2
√
a2+b2
y3
4(x + y) dx dy
=
1
4 ·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 ·
[
ln(x + y)
] a2√
a2+b2
a2
2
√
a2+b2
dy
=
1
4 ·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 · ln ©­«
a2√
a2+b2
+ b
2
2
√
a2+b2
+ y
a2
2
√
a2+b2
+ y
ª®¬ dy
=
1
4 ·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 · ln
(
1 + a
2 + b2
a2 + 2y
√
a2 + b2
)
dy
≥ 14 ·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 · ln
(
1 + a
2 + b2
a2 + ab
)
dy (10)
To simplify (10) recall that a ≤ b, by assumption. Thus b√
a2+b2
≥ 1√
2
≥ 12 . This implies that∫
Ja,b
y3
4(x + y) dx dy ≥
1
4 ·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 · ln
(
1 + a
2 + b2
a2 + ab
)
dy
≥ 18 ·
(
1 + ln
(
b
a
))
·
∫ ab
2
√
a2+b2
0
y3 dy
≥ 18 ·
(
1 + ln
(
b
a
))
·
∫ a
4
0
y3 dy
=
1
211 a
4 ·
(
1 + ln
(
b
a
))
(11)
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Here the second inequality arises since(
1 + a
2 + b2
a2 + ab
)2
=
(
b
a
+
2
b
a + 1
)2
≥
(
b
a
+
a
b
)2
≥ 2 +
(
b
a
)2
≥ e · b
a
Thus, taking the log on both sides gives the second inequality. Putting together inequalities (9)
and (11) completes the proof. □
Theorem 4.4. For the unit square H, the expected group size after T rounds is E[|GT |] ≳ ln(T ).
Proof. For each t , consider the triangle At = conv
(
(0, 0),
(
0, 1
4t
1
4
)
,
(
1
4t
1
4
, 0
))
. As discussed, the
triangle At is a cap of the unit square. Observe that,
Pr[X t+1] ≥ Pr[Z (At ) ∧ (St ∩At = ∅)]
= Pr[Z (At ) | (St ∩At = ∅) ] · Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ ]
≥ Pr[Z (At ) | At ] · Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ ]
≳ 1
t
· Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ ] (12)
Here the second inequality follows from Corollary 2.2. The third inequality is derived by applying
Lemma 4.3 with respect to the cap At , for which a = b = 1
4t
1
4
.
Claim 4.5. There exist constants c,τ such that Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ ] ≥ c for all t ≥ τ
proof of claim. First we show that there exists constant τ such that the convex hull Sτ contains
the square Q =
[ 1
4 ,
3
4
]2 with probability bounded below by some positive constant. To see this, let
T1,T2,T3 and T4 be right-angled triangles each containing one of the corners with perpendicular
side lengths a = b = 14 . By Lemma 4.3, the probability of accepting a candidate inside triangle Tℓ ,
given no member is currently in Tℓ , is lower bounded by a
4
211 =
1
219 . Hence we have,
Pr[Tℓ ∩ S i = ∅] ≤
(
1 − 1219
) i
= ki (13)
Fig. 3. Figure on the left illustrates that if there is a member in each Tℓ then Q ⊆ Si . The figure on the right
shows if ξ ∈ B
((
1
4 ,
3
4
)
,w1
)
∩ B
((
3
4 ,
1
4
)
,w1
)
then ∥ξ ∥1 ≥ ∥w1∥1
Observe that if there is a member of S i selected in each of the four triangles T1,T2,T3 and T4
then Q ⊆ S i , as illustrated in Figure 3. Consequently, applying the union bound and (13), for all
12
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 4, we have Pr[Q ⊈ S i ] ≤ 4ki . Note, since k = 1 − 1219 , there exists a fixed constant τ such
that 4kτ < 1; hence, Pr[Q ⊆ Sτ ] ≥ 1 − 4kτ > 0. Consider any round t ≥ τ + 1 then,
Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ ] ≥ Pr[ (St ∩At = ∅) ∧ (Q ⊆ Sτ ) ]
= Pr[ St ∩At = ∅ | Q ⊆ Sτ ] Pr[Q ⊆ Sτ ] (14)
Since we know that Pr[Q ⊆ Sτ ] is bounded below by a constant, we need to show the remaining
term of (14) is bounded below by constant. Recursively we have,
Pr[St ∩At = ∅ | Q ⊆ Sτ ]
= Pr[¬Z (At ) ∧ (St−1 ∩At = ∅) | Q ⊆ Sτ ]
= Pr[¬Z (At ) | (St−1 ∩At = ∅) ∧ (Q ⊆ Sτ )] · Pr[ St−1 ∩At = ∅ |Q ⊆ Sτ ]
= Pr[ Sτ ∩At = ∅ | Q ⊆ Sτ ] ·
t−1∏
i=τ
(1 − Pr[Z (At ) | S i ∩At = ∅ ∧ (Q ⊆ Sτ )])
≳ Pr[ Sτ ∩Aτ = ∅ | Q ⊆ Sτ ] ·
t−1∏
i=τ
(1 − Pr[Z (At ) | S i ∩At = ∅ ∧ (Q ⊆ Sτ )])
≳ Pr[ Sτ ∩Aτ = ∅ | Q ⊆ Sτ ] ·
t−1∏
i=τ
(1 − Pr[Z (At ) | Q])
≳
t−1∏
i=τ
(1 − Pr[Z (At ) | Q]) (15)
Here the first inequality holds because, by definition, At ⊆ Aτ for all t ≥ τ + 1. For the second
inequality, observe that Sτ ⊆ S i when i ≥ τ . Thus, by Corollary 2.2, Pr[Z (At ) | S i ∩At = ∅ ∧ (Q ⊆
Sτ )] ≤ Pr[Z (At ) | Q ]. The last inequality holds because τ is constant, so Aτ is a small fixed triangle
and there is a positive probability that no candidate was selected inside Aτ in the first τ rounds,
even when the convex hull of the members includes the square Q .
Next, we claim that if Q is the convex hull then a candidate can be accepted inside At only if
both candidates are in At . In particular, this gives the following useful inequality:
Pr[ Z (At ) | Q] ≤ vol(At )2 =
(
1
2
(
1
4t 14
)2)2
=
1
210 · t (16)
To see this, suppose the claim is false. That is,w2 ∈ At is selected when Q is the convex hull but
w1 < At . Then, by Lemma 2.3, it must be the case that
w2 ∈ B
((
1
4 ,
1
4
)
,w1
)
∩ B
((
3
4 ,
1
4
)
,w1
)
∩ B
((
1
4 ,
3
4
)
,w1
)
∩ B
((
3
4 ,
3
4
)
,w1
)
Observe that w1 ∈ At if and only if ∥w1∥1 = |(w1)1 | + |(w1)2 | ≤ 1
4t
1
4
, where (w1)i denotes the
i’th component ofw1. Sincew1 < At , we have ∥w1∥1 > 1
4t
1
4
. As illustrated in Figure 3, the region
B(( 14 , 34 ),w1) ∩ B(( 34 , 14 ),w1) does not intersect At ifw1 < At . Thus, the winnerw2 cannot be inside
At and the claim is verified.
Finally combining (14),(15) and (16), we have for any t ≥ τ + 1
Pr[St ∩At = ∅] ≳
t−1∏
i=τ
(
1 − 1210 · t
)
≳
(
1 − 1210 · t
)t
□
13
Using the Claim 4.5 and (12) we get Pr[X t+1] ≳ 1t for any t ≥ τ + 1. Ergo, we have E[GT ] =∑T
t=1 Pr[X t ] ≳
∑T
t=τ+1
1
t  ln(T ). □
5 UPPER BOUNDS ON EXPECTED GROUP SIZE
We now apply the techniques developed in Sections 3 and 4 to upper bound the expected cardinality
of the group for the unit ball and the unit square. Specifically, we apply Corollary 3.2 to these
metric spaces using the fK obtained from Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.3, respectively.
5.1 Upper Bound for the Unit Ball
Observe that exactly one of the two Voronoi regions corresponds to a circular segment. Furthermore,
since a circular segment fits inside its complement, arg min
i
Pr[Z (Hi (w1,w2))|Hi (w1,w2)] is attained
by the Hi corresponding to a circular segment. Let δ (w1,w2) denote the height of the circular seg-
ment for this Voronoi regionHi . Then, by Lemma 4.1, we havemin
i
Pr[Z (Hi (w1,w2)) |Hi (w1,w2) ] ≳
δ (w1,w2)4. Thus fB(w1,w2) = δ (w1,w2)4, satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.2. However when
using Corollary 3.2 we need to understand Φ(λ); Lemma 5.1 allows us to do exactly that.
Lemma 5.1. Let δ (w1,w2) be the height of the circular segment Hi (w1,w2) formed by the Voronoi
regions. Then, for all λ ≤ 1104 , we have
Φ(λ) =
∫ ∫
I
[
δ (w1,w2)4 ≤ λ
]
dw1 dw2 ≲ λ
7
8
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let H be the hyperplane separating the two Voronoi regions. Since H
contains the midpoint 12 (w2 +w1) and has normal vectorw2 −w1, it holds that
H(w1,w2) =
{
ξ ∈ R2 : (w2 −w1) ·
(
ξ − w2 +w12
)
= 0
}
(17)
By basic algebra, the distance from the origin toH is | ∥w2 ∥2−∥w1 ∥2 |
2
√
(w2−w1)22+(w2−w1)21
. Hence we have,
δ (w1,w2) = 1 −
©­­«
|∥w2∥2 − ∥w1∥2 |
2
√
(w2 −w1)22 + (w2 −w1)21
ª®®¬ (18)
Note that δ (w1,w2) = δ (w2,w1) because swapping positions of the candidates does not change
the sizes of Voronoi regions. It will now be convenient to work with polar coordinates. So denote
w1 = (r ,φ) andw2 = (ξ ,θ ). Observe that
Φ(λ) =
∫ ∫
I
[
δ (w1,w2) ≤ λ 14
]
dw2 dw1
= 2
∫ ∫
I
[
δ (w1,w2) ≤ λ 14 , ∥w1∥ ≤ ∥w2∥
]
dw2 dw1
= 2
∫ π
−π
∫ 1
0
∫
I
[
δ ((r ,φ),w2) ≤ λ 14 , r ≤ ∥w2∥
]
dw2 r dr dφ
= 4π
∫ 1
0
∫
I
[
δ ((r , 0),w2) ≤ λ 14 , r ≤ ∥w2∥
]
dw2 r dr
14
= 4π
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
r
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (ξ ,θ )) ≤ λ 14
]
ξ dθ dξ r dr
≤ 4π
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
r
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
]
ξ dθ dξ r dr
= 4π
∫ 1
0
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
] ( 1 − r 2
2
)
r dθ dr (19)
The first equality follows as δ (w1,w2) = δ (w2,w1). The fourth equality holds by rotational symmetry.
The inequality holds because, by equation (18), we have
δ ((r , 0), (ξ ,θ )) = 1 −
(
ξ 2 − r 2
2
)
1√
ξ 2 sin2(θ ) + (ξ cos(θ ) − r )2
= 1 −
(
ξ 2 − r 2
2
)
1√
ξ 2 + r 2 − 2rξ cos(θ )
≥ 1 −
(
1 − r 2
2
)
1√
1 + r 2 − 2r cos(θ )
= δ ((r , 0), (1,θ ))
Note that if r < 1 − 2λ 14 then we have δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≥ δ ((r , 0), (1, 0)) = 1−r2 > λ
1
4 . Hence we see∫ 1
0
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
] ( 1 − r 2
2
)
r dθ dr
=
∫ 1
1−2λ 14
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
] ( 1 − r 2
2
)
r dθ dr
≲ λ 12 max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
]
dθ (20)
Here the last inequality hold as
∫ 1
1−2λ 14
(
1−r 2
2
)
rdr ≤
∫ 1
1−2λ 14 (1 − r )dr = 2λ
1
2 . Finally, note that
max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
[
δ ((r , 0), (1,θ )) ≤ λ 14
]
dθ
= max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
[
1 −
(
1 − r 2
2
)
1√
1 + r 2 − 2r cos(θ )
≤ λ 14
]
dθ
≤ max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
1 −
(
1 − r 2
2
)
1√
1 + r 2 − 2r (1 − θ 28 )
≤ λ 14
 dθ
= max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
[√
1 + r 2 − 2r (1 − θ
2
8 ) ≤
1 − r 2
2(1 − λ 14 )
]
dθ
= max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I
[√
(1 − r )2 + rθ
2
4 ≤
1 − r 2
2(1 − λ 14 )
]
dθ
= max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I

√
1 + rθ
2
4(1 − r )2 ≤
1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
 dθ (21)
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Now, if |θ | ≥ 8λ 38 then for any r ∈ [1 − 2λ 14 , 1], we have√
1 + rθ
2
4(1 − r )2 −
1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
≥
√
1 + 16rλ
3
4
(1 − r )2 −
1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
≥
√
1 + 16rλ
3
4
4λ 12
− 1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
≥
√
1 + 4rλ 14 − 1
(1 − λ 14 )
≥
√
1 + 4(1 − 2λ 14 )λ 14 − 1
(1 − λ 14 )
> 0
Here the last inequality holds for any λ 14 ≤ 110 . Hence,
max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ π
−π
I

√
1 + rθ
2
4(1 − r )2 ≤
1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
 dθ
≤ max
r ∈[1−2λ 14 ,1]
∫ 8λ 38
−8λ 38
I

√
1 + rθ
2
4(1 − r )2 ≤
1 + r
2(1 − λ 14 )
 dθ
≤ 16λ 38 (22)
Finally, combining (19), (20), (21) and (22), we have, for all λ 14 ≤ 0.1, that
Φ(λ) ≲ λ 12 · λ 38 = λ 78 □
Theorem 5.2. For the unit ball B, the expected group size after T rounds is E[|GT |] ≲ T 18 .
Proof. Let t0 be a constant such that such that ln(t0)t0 ≤ 1104 , then for any round t ≥ t0 we have
0 ≤ λ ≤ ln(t )t ≤ ln(t0)t0 ≤ 1104 . Thus applying Corollary 3.2 along with Lemma 5.1 for t ≥ t0, we see
that
Pr[X t+1] ≲ 1
t
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
te−tλλ
7
8dλ =
1
t
+
1
t
7
8
∫ ln(t )
0
e−u · u 78du ≲ 1
t
7
8
Here the equality holds by the substitution u = tλ. The last inequality holds since∫ ln(t )
0
e−uu
7
8 du ≤ 1 +
∫ ∞
1
e−uu du ≤ 2
The theorem follows as E[|GT |] = ∑Tt=1 Pr[X t ] ≲ t0 + ∑Tt=t0+1 1/t 78 ≲ T 18 by applying integral
bounds. □
5.2 Upper Bound for the Unit Square
Similar to the unit ball case, we must find an appropriate function fH satisfying the conditions of
Corollary 3.2. For a cap A with A ⊆ Hi (w1,w2) by Corollary 2.2,
Pr[ Z (Hi (w1,w2)) | Hi (w1,w2) ] ≥ Pr[ Z (A) | Hi (w1,w2) ] ≥ Pr[ Z (A) | A ] (23)
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Let a(w1,w2) ≤ b(w1,w2) be the two side lengths of the triangular cap of greatest area that fits
inside both Hi (w1,w2). Applying Lemma 4.3, along with (23) gives
min
i
Pr[ Z (Hi (w1,w2)) | Hi (w1,w2) ] ≳ a(w1,w2)4 · ln
(
e · b(w1,w2)
a(w1,w2)
)
Thus fH(w1,w2) = a(w1,w2)4 ln
(
e b(w1,w2)a(w1,w2)
)
satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.2.
Lemma 5.3. Let a(w1,w2) ≤ b(w1,w2) be the two side lengths of the triangular cap of greatest
area that fits inside both Hi (w1,w2). Then, for any λ ≤ 120 ,
Φ(λ) =
∫ ∫
I
[
a(w1,w2)4 · ln
(
e · b(w1,w2)
a(w1,w2)
)
≤ λ
]
dw1 dw2 ≲ λ · ln
(
ln
(
1
λ
))
Proof. We need only consider pairs w1 and w2 that satisfy the indicator function. As λ ≤ 120 ,
this implies a(w1,w2) ≤ λ 14 ≤
( 1
20
) 1
4 ≤ 12 and, without loss of generality, H1(w1,w2) is the smallest
Voronoi region and fits (under symmetries) into H2(w1,w2). Furthermore, applying rotational and
diagonal symmetries, any pair of points can be transformed into a pair of the formw1 = (x ,y) and
w2 = (x + ∆x ,y + ∆y ), with s = ∆y/∆x ≤ 1 and ∆x ,∆y ≥ 0. Hence, we lose only a constant factor
in making the following assumptions on w1 and w2: the triangular cap of greatest area that fits
inside both the Hi (w1,w2) is contained in H1(w1,w2); the cap contains the origin; the larger side
corresponding to b(w1,w2) is along the y-axis; the smaller side corresponding to a(w1,w2) is along
the x-axis.
Recall that H1(w1,w2) is either a right-angled triangle or a right-angled trapezoid. In the former
case, the triangular cap of greatest area which fits inside both of the Voronoi regions is H1 itself.
The side lengths of H1 are then the intercepts of H along the axes, where H is the hyperplane
separating the two Voronoi regions. In the latter case, the triangular cap of greatest area satisfies
b(w1,w2) = 1 and a(w1,w2) is the intercept of H on the x-axis. We can then compute explicit
expressions for both terms a(w1,w2) and b(w1,w2). In particular,
a(w1,w2) = ∥w2∥
2 − ∥w1∥2
2(w2 −w1)1 = x + sy +
∆x
2 (1 + s
2) = x + sy + ∆y2
(
1 + s2
s
)
(24)
The first equality holds by definition (17) of hyperplaneH . Now, because this is the unit square,
we have b(w1,w2) ≤ 1. Thus, b(w1,w2) = min
(
1, a(w1,w2)s
)
. Hence,
a(w1,w2)4 ln
(
e · b(w1,w2)
a(w1,w2)
)
= a(w1,w2)4 ln
(
e min
(
1
a(w1,w2) ,
1
s
))
(25)
For a fixed w1 = (x ,y), let R(x ,y) be a rectangle containing all the points w2 = (x + ∆x ,y + ∆y )
satisfying the condition of the indicator function. Thus, it will suffice to show that we can select
R(x ,y) to have small area. To do this we must show that ∆x and ∆y cannot be too large. Again,
recall that if the indicator function is true then a(w1,w2) ≤ λ 14 . So (24) implies x ≤ λ 14 and s ≤ λ
1
4
y .
If λ 14 ≤ y ≤ 1 then min
(
1
a(w1,w2) ,
1
s
)
≥ y
λ
1
4
. Plugging into (25) gives a(w1,w2)4 · ln
(
e · b(w1,w2)a(w1,w2)
)
≥
17
a(w1,w2)4 · ln
(
e · y
λ
1
4
)
. It follows that a(w1,w2) ≤ λ1/4
ln1/4
(
ey
λ1/4
) . Therefore, (24) gives:
∆x ≤ 2 ·
©­­«
λ
1
4
ln
1
4
(
ey
λ
1
4
) − ys − xª®®¬ ≤ 2 ·
©­­«
λ
1
4
ln
1
4
(
ey
λ
1
4
) − xª®®¬ (26)
∆y ≤ 2s ·
©­­«
λ
1
4
ln
1
4
(
ey
λ
1
4
) − ys − xª®®¬ ≤
1
2y ·
©­­«
λ
1
4
ln
1
4
(
ey
λ
1
4
) − xª®®¬
2
(27)
The final inequalities in (26) and (27) were obtained by optimizing over s ∈ [0, 1]. Then noting that
x ≤ λ 14 , we have
Φ(λ) ≲
∫ 1
0
∫ λ 14
0
|R(x ,y)| dx dy
=
∫ λ 14
0
∫ λ 14
0
|R(x ,y)| dx dy +
∫ 1
λ
1
4
∫ λ 14
0
|R(x ,y)| dx dy
≲ λ +
∫ 1
λ1/4
1
y
·
∫ λ1/4
ln1/4( ey
λ1/4 )
0
(
λ1/4
ln1/4( eyλ1/4 )
− x
)3
dx dy
≲ λ ·
∫ 1
λ1/4
1
y
· 1
ln( eyλ1/4 )
dy
≲ λ · ln
(
ln
(
1
λ
))
For the second inequality, since ∆x must be positive, (26) implies that the limit of the integral
becomes x = λ1/4
ln1/4( ey
λ1/4 )
. To bound the area |R(x ,y)| of the rectangles we have two cases. When
0 ≤ y ≤ λ 14 , observe, by (24), that a(w1,w2) ≤ λ 14 implies ∆x ≤ 2λ 14 and ∆y ≤ 2λ 14 . Thus
|R(x ,y)| ≤ ∆x · ∆y ≲
√
λ. When λ 14 ≤ y ≤ 1, the bound on |R(x ,y)| holds by (26) and (27). □
Theorem 5.4. For the unit square H, the expected group size after T rounds is
E[|GT |] ≲ lnT · ln lnT
Proof. Note that for any round t ≥ 100 we have 0 ≤ λ ≤ ln(t )t ≤ 120 . Thus, combining
Corollary 3.2 and Lemma 5.3 we get
Pr[X t+1] ≲ 1
t
+
∫ ln(t )
t
0
te−tλ · λ ln
(
ln
(
1
λ
))
dλ
=
1
t
+
1
t
∫ 1
0
u ln
(
ln
( t
u
))
du +
1
t
∫ ln(t )
1
ue−u ln
(
ln
( t
u
))
du
Here the equality holds via the substitution u = tλ. Note that u ln
(
ln
( t
u
) ) ≤ ln ln t , when t ≥ 100
and 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Furthermore,∫ ln(t )
1
ue−u · ln
(
ln
( t
u
))
du ≤ ln ln t ·
∫ ∞
1
ue−u du ≤ ln ln t
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Hence it follows Pr[X t+1] ≲ ln ln tt for all t ≥ 100. Finally, we see that E[|GT |] =
∑T
t=1 Pr[X t ] ≲
100+
∑T
t=101
ln ln t
t ≲ lnT · ln lnT , where the last inequality was obtained using integral bounds. □
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented techniques for studying the evolution of an exclusive social group in a
metric space, under the consensus voting mechanism. A natural open problem is to close the gap
between the Ω(lnT ) lower bound and the O(lnT · ln lnT ) upper bound on the expected cardinality
of the group, after T rounds, in the unit square. Interesting further directions include the study of
higher dimensional metric spaces, and allowing for more than two candidates per round. In either
direction, our analytic tools may prove useful.
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